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Contrariety and Change: Problems Plato Set for Aristotle
James Bogen (Pitzer College)
Charles M. Young (Claremont Graduate School)

I

Plato and Aristotle each believe that contrariety is fundamental to the analysis o f change. At
Phaedo 7 0 e 4 -7 1 a l0 , for exam ple, Socrates says that all things that have an origin (εχει γ εν έσ ιν )
and that have contraries (ενα ντ ία 1 ) come to be (γίγνετα ι) out o f (έκ ) contraries. Thus if som e
thing com es to be greater, it must previously have been sm aller, and vice versa. Other illustrations
include com ing to be weaker, faster, better, and more just from the contrary conditions. “Every
thing,” Socrates says, “com es to be in this way: contrary things from contraries” ( Phaedo 71a910). A ristotle expresses a remarkably similar view at Physics 1.5, 188b21-26:
[A ]ll things that come to be, come to be out o f contraries (έξ ενα ντίω ν), and all
things that pass away, pass away into their contraries or intermediates between
(ενς ενα ντ ία κα ι τα τούτω ν μεταξύ). And the intermediates are out o f contraries.
For exam ple, colors come to be out o f pale and dark (έκ λευκ οΰ κ α ι μ ελα νό ς).
And so all o f the things that come to be by nature are either contraries or things
that com e to be out o f contraries.2
Although the Phaedo offers different examples and says nothing about interm ediates,3 there are
enough sim ilarities between the passages from the Phaedo and the Physics to com mit both Plato
and A ristotle to the idea that all things have their origins in contraries.
If w e wish to understand Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts o f change, then, w e m ust first un
derstand their accounts o f contrariety. Their accounts differ on a number o f points. T hey disagree
profoundly on the ontology o f contrary features. Aristotle form ulates a definition o f contrariety;
Plato never does.4 They even disagree about what features count as contraries: largeness and
sm allness, for exam ple, are star examples o f contraries for Plato, but Aristotle denies that these
features are contraries at all (see Categories 6, 5b 14-29). \V e believe that the story o f how Plato
mid Aristotle came to hold the views they do on contrariety is a fascinating one, and one w ell worth
telling. In this paper we tell the first part o f the story, Plato’s.

1 Although “contraries” is a standard translation o f ενα ντία in Aristotle, “opposites” is often used
as a translation in Plato. There is something to be said for this practice: Plato and Aristotle have
different ideas about ένα ντίω σ ις. H owever, in the b elief that it is a single thing they have different
ideas about, we use “contraries” for both. Where required, we will use the terms “Platonic contrar
ies” and “Aristotelian contraries” to distinguish between them.
2 See also Metaphysics X .4, 1055M 6-17; De Cáelo 1.3, 270aI4-17; Generation and Corruption
1.7, 323b28-324a9.
3 Arguably Phaedrus 262a anticipates the notion o f intermediates in speaking o f a thing’s changing
from a feature to its contrary “bit by bit” (κατά σμίκρον).
4 Arguably Philehus 12d-13a anticipates Aristotle’s definition o f contrariety as maximum differ
ence within a genus (Metaphysics X .4, 1055a5-6).
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Before w e begin to look at any details o f Plato’s view a consumer’s warning is in order to alert
the reader to a peculiarity o f our interpretation: we believe the forms do considerably less work in
Plato’s theorizing about contrariety and change than the literature might suggest. The best w ay to
illustrate the idiosyncrasy o f our reading is to contrast it with a more fam iliar picture o f the role o f
the forms in Plato’s explanation o f change.
According to V lastos, Socrates is w ise just in case Socrates participates in the form o f wisdom ,
and in general, for any subject, S, and any feature, F, there is a form, the F itself, such that S has F
ju st in case S has a share in the F itself (V lastos 1981, 270-271). According to the Phaedo theory
o f explanation (which we w ill consider in more detail below ), if something is F (beautiful, or large,
or hot, for exam ple), its having a share in the F explains why it is F ( Phaedo. lOOd). According to
V lastos if w e explained, say, the coldness o f a dish o f borsch in this way, the explanation would
tell that the borsch is cold in virtue o f its ‘satisfying... [a] definition’ whose ‘logical content’ is
what ‘...m arks o ff the Form [the cold itself]...from all...other form s...’ (V lastos, 92)5 These are
‘safe but stupid’-hereafter, ‘plain’-explanations (1 0 5 cl). I f V lastos is right they are inform ative in
roughly the same w ay as Aristotelian formal cause explanations (V lastos, 91-2; see Physics II.3).
W e ask why something has such and such a feature. The explanation tells us what it is to have that
feature. That answers our question once w e see that the object has whatever the explanation tells us
is necessary and Sufficient for possessing the feature in question.2
This paper is concerned with changes consisting in the replacement o f som e feature F by som e
feature G, where F and G are mutually exclusive. I f we cooled some borsch by putting snow in it,
the borsch’s ceasing to be hot and coming to be cold would be a change o f this kind. According to
V lastos’s story, one form (the hot itself) would determine what it is-and hence, what is necessary
and su fficien t-for the soup to be hot, and another form (the cold itself) would determine what it is and hence what is necessary and sufficient-for the soup to be cold.
In our exam ple, the snow is an explanation-a ‘more elegant’ ( 105c2)-hereafter, ‘fancy’-a s
opposed to a plain explanation-of the change in temperature. Such explanations rësemble Aristote
lian efficient causes (V lastos, 91-2; see Physics II.3). V lastos thinks fancy explanations depend for
their explanatory value upon further facts about the forms. For the snow to cool the soup, it must
be cold and m ust make things that contain it cold by virtue o f a ‘physical law ' or a ‘law o f nature’.
W hat makes the coldness o f and the cooling capacity o f snow a matter o f physical law rather than
mere, brute fact regularity6 is the obtaining o f what V lastos calls a ‘relation o f entailm ent’ between
the form s o f cold and snow (V lastos, 105) that guarantees that snow w ill introduce cold into what
ever w e put it in. Presumably the cold that the snow brings to the borsch lowers its temperature
because o f som e sort o f exclusionary relation between the hot itself and the cold itself.
V lastos’s view exem plifies the common assumption that the theory o f forms is a major com po
nent o f Plato’s understanding o f change. But w e think the forms are next to irrelevant to features
that figure in a w ide variety o f changes-som e o f which are discussed in the Phaedo itself. T o see
why, suppose the borsch we cooled was hot relative to a knish w e wanted to serve it with (H t for
short), but not as hot, e.g., as burning charcoal or molten lava. Suppose the snow made it cold rel
ative to the same knish (C k ), but not as cold as frozen water or dry ice. According to the terminol
ogy w e introduce in §iii and §iv below, to possess Hk is to be qualifiedly hot, and to possess Gk is
5 This is not V lastos’s exam ple, but he intends his account o f fancy explanations to be quite gen
eral, and thus to apply to temperatures.
6 Cp. Dem os 1966, 176ff. and 186-7.

to be qualifiedly cold. On our interpretations (developed in the next tw o sections) even i f a share in
the cold itse lf is necessary-for being cool relative to the knish, it is not sufficient. Furthermore, a
fu ll description o f the nature o f the cold itself would not serve-even if combined w ith descriptions
o f other form s-to provide a specification o f exactly what it is to be Ck. The same holds for Hk.7
T his means not only that the forms cannot be plain explanations for the temperature o f the borsch
before or after the change, but also, that they cannot ground fancy explanations in the w ay V lastos
thought. Suppose an ‘entailment relation’ does hold between the form o f snow and the cold itself.
Suppose an exclusion relation holds between the hot itself and the cold itself. Suppose that because
o f “entailment relations” between the relevant forms, snow m ust bring shares o f the cold itse lf into
anything that contains it. Even so, the soup can have a share in the hot itself without being H i, the
soup can have a share in the cold itself without being C k, and neither form can show us what it is to
have either o f those temperatures. This is enough to render the basic story utterly inapplicable. The
sam e holds, w e think, for changes involving many different sorts o f features. But where thé basic
story doesn’t apply, the forms can have little work to do in explaining change:
A related peculiarity o f our interpretation concerns Plato’s idea that the successful practice o f
m edicine, shoemaking, and every other practical art or craft (τέχνη ) depends upon bringing about
change in which sizes and other quantities are brought from excess and defect to an ideal or desir
able magnitude. A t Statesman 283d-284b Plato observes that the determination o f the desirable
magnitudes, the excesses, and the deficiencies presupposes fixed standards against which the rele
vant quantities can be measured. It has been suggested that the forms are the ‘the absolute stan
dards’ the craftsman must rely upon for this purpose (Dem os 1 9 6 6 ,175ff). W e believe the forms
are so far from being able to perform this function that Aristotle had no reason even to consider
them as alternatives to his own view s about o f change in quantity, and about changes from excess
or deficiency to desirable magnitudes or proportions;
111
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W e begin with the Phaedo version o f the theory o f forms:
I’m going to try to explain to you the kind o f cause I have been concerned with. I
go back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them, laying it down that
there is something beautiful itself by itself itself (τι κ α λ ό ν αυτό κα θ’ α υτό), and
good, and tall, and all the rest. I f you grant me them and agree that they exist, I
hope from them to explain cause to you, and to show you in what w ay the soul is
im m ortal.... Consider, then, whether you agree with me on what com es next. For
it seem s to me that, if anything is beautiful other than the beautiful itself α υτό το
κ α λ ό ν), then it is beautiful for no other reason than because (διότι) it shares in
(μ ετέχει) that beautiful. And I say this about everything. (100b3-c6)
Thus Socrates begins by positing the existence o f forms corresponding to the features beauty,
goodness, tallness, and “all the rest.” Then he appeals to these forms in explaining w hy certain ob
jects have the features in question. Suppose, for exam ple, that Helen is beautiful. Then according
to the Phaedo, what makes her beautiful is her sharing in the beautiful itself: she is beautiful pre
cisely because she “shares in the beautiful itself.” M oreover, her sharing in the beautiful itse lf is
the only thing that, according to the theory, can make her beautiful: she is beautiful for no other
reason than that. According to the theory, then, H elen’s sharing in the beautiful itse lf is both nec
essary and sufficient for her being beautiful.

7 W e assum e o f course that there are no such forms as the cold (hot) relative to the knisch itself.

Since Plato seem s clearly to say so here,8 it is commonly supposed that he believes that for
any object and any feature, the object’s sharing in the form corresponding to the feature is both
necessary and sufficient for the object’s having the feature. There are, however, good reasons for
thinking that Phaedo 100b-c overstates Plato’s real view , at least in the Phaedo. First, a case can
be made for the claim that the Phaedo restricts the scope o f its theory to forms for contrary fea
tures. Only forms for contraries are mentioned in Socrates’ initial list at 100b6, and no forms for
features other than contraries are mentioned elsewhere in the dialogue.9 In any event, since w e are
interested here sim ply in contraries, we w ill consider the theory only in its application to contrary
features, and leave open the question o f its applicability to other features.
M ore importantly, at least for our purposes in this paper, there is reason to think that the Phae
do does not in fact accept the claim that sharing in a form is sufficient for having the corresponding
feature. Consider the discussion o f comparatives 102a-103a. Here what is taken to be in need o f
explanation is the fact that Simmias is both larger than Socrates and sm aller than Phaedo (102M 5). A t 1 0 2 c l0 -l 1, Socrates tells us that in such a ca se -“when he is between the tw o o f them”
(1 0 2 c l l ) - “Sim m ias has the name o f being both small and large” (ô Σ ιμμίας επ ω νυ μ ία ν εχει
σμ ικρός τε κ α ι είν α ι). W e take it that “having the name o f being small and large” here is peri
phrastic for “is sm all and large.” I f so, Socrates is telling us that if Simmias is larger than Socrates
and sm aller than Phaedo, then Simmias is large and small. In this case, then, Sim mias has the fea
ture largeness in virtue o f being larger than Socrates. And although, as w e shall see, mention is
made o f Sim m ias’s sharing in die large itself in the explanation o f his being larger to Socrates,
other things m ust be mentioned as well. So in this case, sharing in a form in not sufficient, by itself,
for having the corresponding feature.10
In cases in which an object’s sharing in a form is sufficient for its having the corresponding
feature, w e w ill say that the object has the feature unqualifiedly, or that it has the feature without
qualification, or that the feature is predicated unqualifiedly. So, for exam ple, since sharing in
sickness w as sufficient to make Plato sick on the day o f the Phaedo (5 9 b l0 ), he w as unqualifiedly
sick on that day. In other cases, where a more com plicated situation-like Sim m ias’s being larger

8 And elsewhere: see, e.g., Phaedo 78e, 100e-101a, 103o, Parmenides 130e-13 la; and Republic
596a6-7. A ristotle attributes the view to Plato at Metaphysics 1.6, 987b 3-10.
9 Arguably the forms for unity and duality mentioned at 101c are exceptions to this claim . H ow
ever, Plato has np clear conception o f what features are and are not contraries, and he may be
treating unity and duality as contraries here. Alternatively, they may sim ply be bad exam ples.
(Parmenides 128e-l30b is happy to treat unity and plurality as contraries.)
10 There is also reason to believe that the Phaedo does not accept the claim that sharing in a form is
necessary for having the corresponding feature. Consider fire, for exam ple. Phaedo 103e clearly
im plies that fire is hot, and 105bc says that we can adequately explain why, e.g ., a stove is hot by
citing the presence in it o f fire. But the Phaedo does not bring the hotness o f fire within the scope
o f the explanatory pattern o f lOObc; it does not say that fire is hot because it shares in the hot it
self. (In fact the Phaedo offers no explanation at all o f why fire is hot. Timaeus 61d-62a does, ex
plaining why fire is hot in terms o f structural features o f fire itself, and not, or not obviously, in
terms o f sharing.) According to the Phaedo, then, fire is hot, but it does not share in the hot itself.
The same is true o f the rest o f the Phaedo's fancy explanatory factors. The dialogue assum es that
three, five, etc., are odd while tw o, four, etc., are even, that snow is cold, that soul is alive, etc., but
it does not explain why these things have the features they do, and, in particular, it does not say
that they have them in virtue o f sharing in forms.
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than S ocrates-is required in order for a subject to have a feature, we w ill say that the object has the
feature qualifiedly or with qualification. Sim m ias’s being large is an exam ple o f one, but not the
only, variety o f qualified predication in Plato. In the next section we w ill look at ju st enough o f the
details o f Phaedo 102c-d to explain how this kind o f qualified predication-being large relative to
som ething else-d iffers on Plato’s account from being unqualifiedly large. After that, w e w ill briefly
describe som e other varieties o f qualified predication in Plato.
iv
Plato explains what makes Simmias larger than Socrates in tw o different w ays w hose connec
tion with one another, and with the earlier discussion o f sharing in forms, is unfortunately not ob
vious. According to the first explanation,
[Sim m ias] surpasses Socrates ... because Socrates has sm allness relative to (πρός)
his [Sim m ias’s] largeness.11
According to the second explanation, when Simmias is compared to Phaedo, who is larger, and
Socrates, who is smaller than he,
Sim mias has the name o f being small and large when he is between the tw o o f
them: submitting his sm allness for the largeness o f the one [Phaedo] to surpass,
and presenting his largeness to the other [Socrates] as something surpassing his
sm allness.12
These tw o explanations raise a number o f questions that Plato does not answ er.13 Plato does
not tell us how Sim m ias’s largeness is related to his sharing in the large itself; w e assum e that it is
a feature he has, in part, because he shares in the large itself. Both explanations use the language
o f “surpassing,” the first in stating the fact to be explained, the second in explaining the fact; w e
assum e that “[Simmias] surpasses Socrates” is a stylistic variant o f “[Sim m ias] is larger than Soc
rates” in the first explanation.14 The second explanation has it that the fact in need o f explanation
is Sim m ias’s having the name o f being large. As before, w e assume that “having the name o f being
large” is periphrastic for “being large”; we also assume that “being large” here is elliptical for
“being large relative to Socrates.”
Even on these assum ptions, the two explanations differ both in how they describe the fact to be
explained and in how they explain that fact. The first has Sim m ias’s being larger than Socrates as
the feet to be explained, the second has Sim mias’s being large relative to Socrates as the fact to be
explained.15 More importantly, the first description depicts Socrates’ sm allness as something he
has relative to someone else’s largeness, while the second may depict it as something that he has
11 Σω κράτους ΰπερέχειν...δτι σμικρότητα έχει ô Σωκράτης προς το εκ είνο υ μέγεθος. (102c3-4)
12 Ο ύτω ς άρα ό Σ ιμμίας επω νυμίαν έχει σμικρός τε κα ί μ έγα ς ε ίν α ι, έν μέσω ω ν άμφοτέρω ν,
του μ έν τω μ εγέθει ύ περ έχειν τη ν σμικρότητα ΰπέχω ν, τφ δε το μέγεθος τής σμικρότητος τής
σμ ικρότη τος παρέχω ν ύπερέχον. ( 102c 10-d2)
13 In what follow s we ignore the comparison to Phaedo in the second explanation.
14 The surpassing relation mentioned in the second explanation is a more com plicated matter. See
n. 17 below .
15 In this context there may be no significant difference between the tw o w ays o f describing the
fact. But in general “X is more F than Y ” and “X is F relative to Y ” w ill not be stylistic variants o f
one another.

6

independently o f any comparison with what anyone else has and that may be compared to what
others have. These tw o explanations o f why Simmias is larger than Socrates16 are hard sayings
w hose interpretation is beset with difficulties we w ill not deal with in this paper.17 For our pur
poses, it is enough to note that on either explanation, Sim m ias’s sharing in the large itse lf in not, by
itself, sufficient for his being large. In addition, Socrates must share in the sm all itself, and Socra
te s’ sm allness must be appropriately related to Sim mias’s largeness.
According to the Phaedo, then, an object may be large in either o f tw o w ays. I f a thing is large
sim ply because it shares in the large itself, we say (follow ing the conventions introduced in the
previous section) that it is unqualifiedly large. If it is large because it is larger than something else,
or large relative to something else, we say that it is qualifiedly large-qualified by a relation to or a
com parison with something else. Although many features (e.g., beauty, hotness, and heaviness)
admit o f com parison, it not clear whether or to what extent Plato intends us to generalize from the
cases o f largeness and sm allness that we just considered. Suppose, though, that w e have a feature
to which the Phaedo account applies. The conditions for having the feature unqualifiedly and hav
ing it relative to something else are different enough to allow one and the same individual to have
the feature relative to with something else but to lack the feature unqualifiedly. Purple is lighter
than indigo, for exam ple, but both colors are dark. Although Claremont is cooler in the summer
than Death V alley, it still gets pretty hot. For this reason, we take it that features that are predi
cated without qualification are different from features whose predication is qualified-not ju st for
features predicated in comparison, but for all varieties o f qualified predication.

16 Sim ilar accounts can be given for Socrates’ being smaller than Sim m ias, Phaedo’s being larger
than Sim m ias, and Sim m ias’s being smaller than Phaedo. But w e are indebted to V anessa DeHarven for pointing out that i f Plato were to give exactly the same explanation, e.g ., for Sim m ias’s
being larger than Socrates that he gives for Socrates’ being smaller than Sim m ias, he would violate
one o f his own conditions for adequate explanations. At Phaedo lO lab, Socrates rejects such ex
planations as “Thelonius is larger than Bud, and Bud is smaller than Thelonius, by a head” be
cause they appeal to the same thing in the explanation o f contrary features. T o avoid explaining
being sm aller and being larger by appeal to the same thing, Plato should say, e.g., that w hile the
relation between the members o f the ordered pair consisting o f Socrates’ sm allness and Sim m ias’s
largeness explains why Socrates is smaller than Simmias, what explains why Sim mias is larger
than Socrates is be a relation between members o f a different ordered pair-consisting o f Sim m ias’s
largeness and Socrates’ sm allness-or a different relation between members o f the same ordered
pair.
17 For exam ple, it is far from obvious what the formal properties o f the “surpassing” relation men
tioned in the second explanation would be, let alone which (if any) relation we are fam iliar with it
might correspond to. M oreover, whatever surpassing turns out to be, the follow ing would seem to
be an obvious difficulty with the second explanation, at least as stated. Consider the sm allness
Sim m ias has in virtue o f being smaller than Phaedo and the largeness he has in virtue o f being
larger than Socrates. W e know that Sim mias’s largeness surpasses Socrates’ sm allness. D oes it
surpass his own sm allness as well? I f it does, then it would seem that he is both larger and sm aller
than him self. A s for the first explanation: it is not clear what it is to say that Socrates’ sm allness is
“something he has relative to the largeness o f someone else,” let alone whether this involves the
surpassing relation mentioned in the second explanation. Finally, it is hard to say whether the tw o
explanations tell tw o different stories or the same story in two different w ays.

V

In addition to the predications discussed in the previous section, which involve Individual Com
parison, there are several other kinds o f qualified predication in Plato’s writings. Q ualified predi
cation m ay also involve:
Sortal Comparison. According to the Hippias Major, the m ost beautiful ape is ugly relative
to human beings, the m ost beautiful pot is ugly relative to maidens, and the m ost beautiful maiden
is ugly relative to the gods (289b). Apes, pots, human beings, and maidens are accordingly “no
more beautiful than ugly” (2 8 9 c).18 W e are familiar with many exam ples involving this sort o f
qualification. Someone can be large for a jockey, small for a football player; fast for a football
player, slow for a sprinter; and so o n .
Here w e have a variety o f qualified predication in which something is said to have a feature
(e.g., beauty) relative to one kind o f thing (e g ., maidens), and the contrary feature (ugliness) rela
tive to things o f another kind (e.g., gods). The difference between these qualified predications and
predications involving comparatives is clear from the fact that if Socrates is five feet tall and The
lonius is an inch taller, Thelonius is tall relative to Socrates but short for a human being. Sim ilarly,
even i f Claremont is large relative to La Verne, it is not large for a city in Southern C alifornia.19
Earlier in the Hippias Major it is affirmed that just people are just by ju stice (2 8 7 c l-2 ), that
w ise people are w ise by wisdom (c5), that good things are good by the good (c4-5), and that beau
tiful things are beautiful by the beautiful (c8 -d l), in language close to that o f the Phaedo.20 So the
Hippias Major, like the Phaedo, allows for the possibility that things can have features unquali
fiedly.
Pure Relation. Republic 479b3-4 asks, “And again, do the many doubles appear any the less
halves than doubles?” Apparently the idea is a group (e.g., six dice) may be called double in rela
tion to one group (e.g., three dice) and half va relation to another group (e.g., tw elve dice).21 A l
though there are obvious sim ilarities between this case and the qualified predication o f largeness
and sm allness,22 the predication o f double and h alf involve no comparatives: although the group o f
six is h a lf in relation to the group o f tw elve, it is not more half, and although it is double in relation
to the group o f three, it is not more double.
R espect. An object can enjoy a feature in one respect and the contrary feature in another re
spect. A t Republic 436c-d, for example, Socrates says that we should describe a spinning top as at
rest with respect to its axis but in motion with respect o f its circumference (436d-e). And in the
Symposium a man can be beautiful with respect to either or both o f tw o parts o f him self: his body
and his soul (21 Ob-c).

18 Regrettably Socrates does not raise the question whether there are beings relative to whom even
the gods are ugly or-to put the issue sharply-whether there are lim its to the series (presumably a
partial ordering) his exam ples imply.
19 A useful discussion o f individual and sortal comparison may be found in W allace 1972.
20N ote in particular 100e2-3: τω κα λφ τά κ α λά καλά.
21 See also Theaetetus 154cff.
22 Indeed, Republic 470b6-7 goes on to ask a question about largeness and sm allness analogous to
b 3-4’s question about double and half.
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Perceiving Subject. According to the theory o f vision o f the Timaeus and the “Heraclitean”
theory o f vision o f the Theaetetus, what is white for one perceiver can be black for another. And
what is beautiful for one perceiver or from one point o f view , or under one set o f circum stances can
be ugly for (from, under) another.23
vi
In dealing with the Phaedo, it is important to bear in mind that its lim ited agenda. Plato’s
principal focus is on the issue o f the immortality o f the soul, and although Socrates claim s that to
allay the worries o f Sim mias and Cebes on this point requires a “com plete investigation” o f the
causes o f com ing to be and ceasing to be (95e8 -9 6 a l), many issues arise that, because they do not
directly affect the main point at issue, go unaddressed. So, for exam ple, as w e have seen, the
Phaedo is not clear on the range o f features for which there are corresponding forms. It is also si
lent on the question o f the relation between the tw o modes o f explanation (plain and fancy) it of
fers, and on the question o f why some features (e.g., largeness and sm allness) apparently lack
fancy explanations. Other unanswered questions have to do with the Phaedo's sketchy treatment o f
qualified and unqualified predication; w e take up some o f these in the next few sections.
vii
Plato’s acceptance o f the varieties o f qualified predication described in §v above introduces
com plications in understanding his claim that contraries come to be out o f contraries.
Some Platonic contraries-e.g., life and death, odd and even-are mutually exclusive: no subject
can exhibit both at the same time. Since no subject can exhibit both members o f a pair o f exclusive
contraries at one and the same tim e, it follow s that no subject can have one such contrary at one
tim e and the other at a latter time without changing during the interval. For exam ple, the number o f
members in a group cannot be even at one tim e and odd at the next, unless the membership in
creases or decreases in size. But many Platonic contraries are not exclusive in this way. Sim mias is
large relative to Socrates, and at the same time small relative to Phaedo; a maiden is beautiful rela
tive to m onkeys, and at the same time ugly relative to gods; a spinning top is in motion with respect

23 See Republic 479affi, where anything that’s F w ill also appear G, and Hippias Major, where
participation in the F itself makes something appear to be F (2 8 9 d e) or to become F when put next
to something else(289a-b). Someone may object, e.g., that to be what we are calling beautiful by
Perceiving Subject is not to be beautiful at all, but simply to appear to be beautiful. T his seem s to
be Plato’s view at Sophist 235e-236a. Here, a sculpture produces a work that is so large that the
low er parts w ill seem larger than they really are, and the upper parts, smaller than they really are
from a normal view ing position. I f the sculptor used ‘the true proportions o f beautiful things’, the
statue would look ugly, and so he uses ‘proportions that are not but w ill seem to be beautiful,’ (ού
τάς ο ΰ σ α ς συμμετρίας ά λ λ α τάς δοξούσας ε ίν α ι κα λά ς). But at Republic 479b, things that
‘appear’ to be beautiful w ill also ‘appear’ to be ugly, just as things that ‘appear’ to be doubles w ill
also ‘appear’ to be halves-and sim ilarly for great and sm all, light and heavy, etc. The verb
φ α ίνομ α ι, here translated in the language o f appearance, is sometimes used to talk about how
things appear as opposed to how they really are. But it is sometimes used in connection with what
is evidently the case. The example o f doubles and halves indicates that in our passage Plato uses
‘appears’ in the second o f these senses: 6 really is double relative to 3, and really is h alf relative to
12. Indeed, the whole point o f his bringing in the language o f appearance here is to introduce a
realm o f ‘what is and is not’(477a6).

9

to its circum ference, and at the same time at rest with respect to its axis.24 This illustrates Plato’s
w illingness to admit the possibility o f compresence for contraries as w ell as for non-contrary fea
tures that anyone would expect subjects to be able to have at the same time. W henever contraries
can be predicated o f one and the same subject at one and the same tim e, it is possible for som ething
can have one o f the contraries at one tim e and the other at a later tim e, without changing in the in
terval. Sim mias w ill be large if we compare him to Socrates in the morning and sm all i f w e com 
pare him to Phaedo in the afternoon, but his size does not change during the day. This raises ques
tions about how to understand Plato’s claim that contraries-as he conceives o f them -com e to be
out o f contraries, and about how much this claim can help us in understanding change and com ing
to be.

Republic IV includes a claim about incompatibility for contraries that seem s to offer som e
help:
1.

E xclusion: Nothing can either be in contrary states or do or suffer contraries at the
same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing. (Republic 4 3 6 b 8 -cl ;
see also 436e8-437a2 and 439b5).

This principle tells us that whenever contraries are predicated, they must be predicated either o f
different subjects, or o f the sam e subject at different tim es, in different respects, or in relation to
different things.25 For exam ple, a man who is standing still and moving his arm requires a division
in the subject: part o f him is at rest, part in motion (436c). The number o f M usketeers is odd and
even: odd prior to D ’Artagnan’s joining them, even afterwards. A top can be at rest and in m otion
at the same time: at rest in respect o f its circumference, in motion in respect o f its axis (436d). And
Sifflmiäs is both small and large: large in relation to Socrates, small in relation to Phaedo.
A s far as w e know Plato nowhere explicitly sets out conditions that distinguish contraries from
non-contrary features, but Exclusion might be used for this purpose. W e see no reason why Plato
should not accept the following as a partial characterization o f contrariety:
2.

Contrariety: Two features are contraries just in case no single subject can be or do or
suffer both features G at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same
thing.26

This condition does partially characterize contrariety: it counts genuine contraries as contraries.
But it seem s inadequate in at least two respects. First, since no single subject can be both hot and
warm at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the sàme thing, hotness and warmth
count as contraries. This seems odd both in counting'hotness and warmth as contraries27 and in al-

24 These exam ples all involve qualified predication. Whether com presence is possible for som e
cases o f unqualified predication is a question oh which the Phaedo is silent. A s w e shall see, the
Republic im plies a negative answer.
25 Thus it tells us that the predication o f contraries is always qualified predication, thus answering
the question that the Phaedo left open.
26 N otice that this does not give us a condition for contrary forms. To get such a condition from
Contrariety, we would have to add conditions that appeal to the role o f those forms in the qualified
and unqualified predication o f the features involved.

27 Republic 43%bc, however, gives some reason to think that Plato might sw állow it. There he sug
gests that the greater is the contrary o f the lesser, and the much greater is the contrary o f the much
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low ing that hotness has more than one contrary.28 Second, since no act can be both unjust and
virtuous, virtue and injustice count as contraries. This seems odd, too: injustice is a species o f vice,
the contrary o f virtue, and virtue is the genus o f justice, the contrary o f injustice.29 Furthermore, it
is arguable that dead people cannot be either qualifiedly or unqualifiedly ill or w ell, honest or dis
honest, graceful or clum sy, friendly or unfriendly, etc. I f this iS so, dead and honest (dishonest,
graceful, etc.) would be contraries according to (2). This is a bad result if contrariety m ust be re
lied on for system atic characterizations o f change. Going from life to death should qualify as a
change, but going from life to lack o f illness, honesty, etc. should not.
via
W orse still, Plato’s acceptance o f qualified predications o f contraries threatens to make change
incoherent, as he him self seems to have realized. At Theaetetus 155a-d, Socrates introduces three
general principles governing change:
3.

I f a thing has a feature (e.g., a certain size or number) at t2 that it lacked at ti, then
between ti and t2 it came to have that featiire.(155b)

4.

I f a thing remains thé same with respect to a feature (e.g., if it remains the same in size
or number) between ti and t2, then it does not come to have another, incom patible fea
ture (e.g., it does not come to be greater or less in size or number) at t2 than it w as at
t,. (155a)

5.

I f nothing is done or happens to a thing (e.g., if nothing is added to or subtracted from
it) between ti and t2, then it remains the same (e.g., in size or number) between ti and
t2. (155b)

These claim s seem to be obvious truths about change generally or quantitative change in par
ticular. According to 155b-c, however, when applied to everyday occurrences, the claim s seem to
im ply a contradiction. Suppose that in January Socrates is large relative to Theaetetus, and that
Socrates neither gains nor loses any o f his substance during the course o f the year, but that Theae
tetus grow s so much that by December Socrates is smáll relative to Theaetetus^ Then Socrates has
a feature in December that he lacked in January: sm allness relative to Theaetetus. By (3), he must
have com e to have that feature between January and December. But by (4) and (5) he didn’t. Since
he neither gained nor lost any o f his substance during the year, it follow s from (5) he remained the
same. And if he remained the same during the year, (4) tells us that he could not have com e to be
sm aller than Theaetetus between January and December.
Plato presents a sim ilar puzzle for a case involving a group o f six dice: that group is more by
h a lf relative to a group o f four and less by h alf relative to a group o f tw elve without undergoing a
change in number (154c). This puzzle is introduced by a general assum ption-a close relative o f (3)
above-w hose acceptance would generate similar puzzles for heat, color, and other features in addi
tion to size (154b).

lesser. It is not a large step from this to the view that the much greater is also contrary to the
greater.
28 Protagoras 332a-333b uses the claim that each contrary has only a single contrary as a premise
in arguing that wisdom and temperance are a single thing since each is the contrary o f folly.
29 A ristotle’s characterization o f contrariety as maximum difference within a genus (Metaphysics
X .4 , 1055a5-6) improves on Contrariety in not being subject to either o f these criticism s.
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Puzzles o f this sort show that for some contraries that belong to things relative to something
else, a subject that has one o f the contraries at one time can have the other at another tim e, without
having changed. Plato can appeal to Contrariety to avoid this result in som e cases. For exam ple, in
the dice puzzle, the group o f six dice is larger by h alf relative to one group and sm aller by h a lf rel
ative to another, and according to Contrariety these tw o features are not contraries. But we can
easily m odify Plato?s exam ple to provide a case in which the group o f six dice passes from con
trary to contrary without changing. Suppose we compare the group o f six to a group that increases
in size from four members to tw elve. Then the group o f six is first larger by h a lf and then sm aller
by h a lf relative to one and the same group. According to Contrariety, being larger by h a lf and be
ing sm aller by h a lf relative to one and the same group are contraries. But even though these fea
tures count as contraries, the group o f six, which was earlier larger by h a lf than the second group,
can be sm aller by h alf later, without undergoing any change. And Contrariety does not help with
the original growing boy puzzle at all: even though it was Theaetetus and not Socrates who
changed, being large relative to Theaetetus and being small relative to Theaetetus qualify as con
traries according to Contrariety, because Socrates cannot be both sm all and large relative to
Theaetetus at one and the same time. Analogous cases can be constructed for relative and for com 
parative predications involving temperature, color, and other features.
ix
Problems o f a different sort arise in connection with changes (e.g., from health to sickness)
involving the unqualified possessions o f contrary features. In the first place, the Phaedo is not
clear on the question o f the conditions under which features are predicated unqualifiedly. In the
case o f som e o f the features the Phaedo discusses, answers seem clear enough. A ll predications o f
oddness and evenness are unqualified, and a collection is even or odd unqualifiedly according as
the number o f its members is or is not divisible by two. Sim ilarly, creatures that meet the definition
o f health w ill count as unqualifiedly healthy. In other cases, certain guesses seem more or less rea
sonable. Since, as w e believe, the hotness o f pure fire is as hot as it gets in Plato’s cosm os, it seem s
reasonable for him to say, for example, that things within a certain range o f the heat o f pure fire
count as unqualifiedly hot. In many cases, however, answers are increasingly problematic: e.g ., is
anything unqualifiedly beautiful, or unqualifiedly large or sm all, apart from the forms correspond
ing to these features?
Problems remain even if we assume that such questions have answers. To illustrate this, con
sider the features largeness and smallness. Recall that unqualified sm allness is a feature Simmias
has just in virtue o f sharing in the form for sm allness, quite apart from any com parison or relation
to Socrates, to men in general; etc. Plato says contraries come to be out contraries (Phaedo 70e471alO ). W e suppose that if unqualified largeness and unqualified sm allness are contraries, and if
Sim m ias w as unqualifiedly small at one time and unqualifiedly large at another, it should follow
from an adequate account o f contrariety that Simmias changed during the interval. But on the
plainest reading o f the text o f Phaedo 102c 10-d2, it would seem that this is false. A t 102el0-d 2,
Sim m ias seem s to have the largeness that makes him larger than Socrates and the sm allness that
makes him smaller than Phaedo independently o f any comparisons to Socrates and Phaedo. Thus
he seem s to be both unqualifiedly large and unqualifiedly small at the same tim e. So if instead w e
compared him to Phaedo in the morning and to Socrates in the evening, he would pass from being
unqualifiedly sm all in the morning to being unqualifiedly small in the evening, without having
changed in between. It seems plausible to us, and we have no doubt that it seemed plausible to
Plato, that nothing can be unqualifiedly large and small at the same time. And for som e features
like sickness and health, it seems not just plausible but obvious. But recognizing the plausibility o f
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such intuitions and accounting for their correctness are by no means the same thing; it is the latter
that gives Plato trouble.
I f Plato has anything definitive to say about the incom patibility o f unqualified contraries, he
says it at Republic 436b-d, which may be read as suggesting an extension o f E xclusion (1) to cover
them. H aving said that nothing can do or suffer contraries at the same tim e, in the same respect,
and in relation to the same thing, he says that if we ever find contraries being done or suffered at
the sam e time we can be sure that the contraries belong to different item s.30 But if this passage
does apply the principle o f exclusion to unqualified contraries, all it tells us is that there are pairs
o f features such that no single subject can possess both members o f any one o f those pairs un
qualifiedly at one and the same time. Presumably w ellness and illness (and largeness and sm all
ness) are pairs o f this kind, while wellness and sm allness (and illness and largeness) are not. I f the
relevant group were defined in such a way that unqualified largeness and sm allness belong, and
therefore that they fall under Exclusion, then Plato could say that being small at one tim e and large
at another is sufficient for change. But Plato has no such account. Although it seem s obvious that
nothing can be unqualifiedly large and small (or w ell and ill) at the same tim e, Plato has no princi
pled account o f why Exclusion should apply to these. On the other hand, if Plato does not intend
E xclusion to apply to the unqualified possession o f contraries, he has no other no way o f ruling out
the p ossibility that Simmias can be unqualifiedly large and small at the same tim e and thus that
Sim m ias could be small at one time and large at another without undergoing a change in size.
Something like this can be said o f qualified contrariety as w ell. Plato certainly does not provide
any explicit account o f why any given features should or should not fall under Contrariety. But his
theory seem s to have more resources here than it does for the ease o f unqualified contraries.31 That
is because in at least some cases an appeal to the factors involved in the qualified possession o f two
features m ay provide a little help in understanding why Exclusion should apply to them. For ex
ample, it should be possible to explain why a given horse could not both ugly and beautiful with
regard to the standards o f beauty and ugliness to horses. And it might be possible for Plato to ex
plain why Socrates could not be both large and small relative to Simmias.
X

Plato’s problems in the Phaedo and the Theaetetus are not problems for us. T o explain why
Sim mias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, we introduce numerical measures o f
quantities: Sim mias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo because his height is greater
than Socrates’ height and less than Phaedo’s. So an obvious question to ask is why Plato didn’t do
what w e would do in dealing with the issues raised in such passages as the Phaedo ’s tortured dis
cussions o f qualified largeness, and the Theaetetus ’ puzzles o f the dice and the growing boy? W hy
didn’t he use numerical measures to analyze the fact that Simmias is smaller than Phaedo and taller
than Socrates? W hy did he worry about how even though Socrates did not change in size, he was at
one tim e larger than Theaetetus and at another time larger without giving numerical measures o f
their height at the relevant times? W hy did he attach so much importance to the fact that one group

30 A t 4 3 6 b 8 -d (ώστε α ν που έυρίσκω μεν έν α ύτοις ταυτα γιγνό μ ενα , εΐσόμεθα οτι ο ύ τα ύτον
η ν ά λ λ α πλείώ ), ταυτα refers to parts o f the soul mentioned earlier. But the doings and sufferings
to which Plato refers are not limited to states o f the soul; the principle is applied immediately to the
motion and rest o f a human body (436c) and then to the motion and rest o f a top (436d).
31 This difference in resources may be due to the fact that for reasons sketched in thé next section
Plato had good reason to pay more attention to qualified than to unqualified contrariety.
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o f dice is ¡smaller by h a lf than a second group and larger by h alf than a third when he could have
counted the dice in each group and compared the numbers?
It is easy to answer such questions unsympathetically. One unsym pathetic answer is that
Plato’s apparent lack o f interest in numerical measures in dealing with quantitative features like
largeness and sm allness betrays a remarkably inadequate and primitive notion o f measurement.
Another unsym pathetic answer is that Plato was merely kicking up sand by presenting spurious
puzzles he could easily have avoided. W e certainly agree that ancient Greek measurement theory
and practice w as less sophisticated than our own. W e also agree that Plato knew that som e o f these
puzzles can be used to support sophistical positions.32 But w e also think that features like lar
geness raise genum ely important issues that must be resolved if numerical measures o f length, tem
perature, w eight, volum e and other quantities are to be theoretically and practically useful.

in the Statesman, Plato says the importance o f the art o f measurement derives from its appli
cation to practical crafts like weaving and Clothes making (<Statesman 284a-b).33 Plato typically
describes the successful practice o f any practical craft as depending upon the avoidance or correc
tion o f excesses and deficiencies o f various item s. Thus the m usician must avoid tightening the
strings o f his lyre too tightly and too loosely. The physician must keep his patient from being hotter
or colder than he should be. Like an athletic trainer, he must know whether the improvement o f one
man’s condition requires him to eat more, less, or the same amount o f food than another.34 D isas
ter ensues i f the craftsman disregards
due measure (το μ έτρειον) by [applying] greater power to things that áre too sm all
[for it]-[to o much] sail to a boat, [too much] food to a body, and [too many] prin
ciples (το μ έτρειον) to a soul35 ... {Laws III, 6 9 1 cl-3 )
I f sufficiency, excess, and deficiency are crucial to the practice o f the crafts, the usefulness o f
a measurement system w ill depend upon the help it provides in determining whether a given quan
tity is too much, too little, or exactly just enough o f what is required for the purpose at hand. And
no measuring system can help with this unless we can find out what is enough, and what is too
much or too little for each given purpose. Thus Plato says the crafts, including statesm anship, de
pend upon the possibility o f establishing standards (μέτρια) relative to which quantities can be
called excessive or deficient (Statesman 284a-c). In order to determine whether, e.g ., a given
amount o f food is sufficient for the physician’s purposes* it w ill not do to find out whether it is
greater (sm aller) than just any smaller (greater) amount.
[T]he more and the less are to be measured relative (πρός) not only to one another,
but also to the attainment o f a due measure (προς τη ν του μέτριου γ έν εσ ιν ).
(Statesman 2 8 4 b l-c l)
The same holds, w e suppose, for large and small amounts; a large amount o f food would be large
riot ju st relative to any small amount . For the purposes o f the physician, it would be large relative
to the amount required to establish or restore the required bodily state. This makes it natural for

32 H e says as much at Theaetetus 154c.
33 In what follow s w e ignore a number o f important com plications.
34 See, e.g .. Republic 349a.
35 W e suppose that with the last phrase Plato has in mind, e g., presenting a student with more
principles o f grammar than he can deal with.
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Plato to think an adequate theory o f the crafts36 must explain what is to be larger and sm aller,
more and less, half, double, equal, etc., and what it is to be to be qualifiedly large, sm all, etc. But it
m ust also account for the standard measures relative to which these com paratives and qualified
predications o f quantity can be used to characterize the excesses and defects that the various crafts
m ust avoid, and the sufficient amounts they aim for.
It seem s clear that the introduction o f a system o f numerical measures without an account o f
the due measures and o f what it is to be large and sm all, etc,, relative to them would have little to
offer in answer to Plato’s concerns about quantities in connection with the crafts. For exam ple, it
would not help a doctor to know how to measure temperature in degrees without knowing how the
resulting numbers could be used to establish whether the patient’s heat is m edically deficient or
excessive.
It is worth mentioning that a related point holds for theoretical crafts, though w e don’t know
whether or in what form Plato would have subscribed to it. The point is nicely illustrated by an
observation o f the nineteenth century physicist, P. G. T a it Tait says that because “there is no such
thing as absolute size” there is no reason why an arbitrarily small object should not be “astoundingly com plex in its structure.”
H owever far w e go [in examining smaller and small bits o f matter] there w ill ap
pear before us something ftirther to be assailed. The small separate particles o f a
gas are each, no doubt less com plex in structure than the whole visible universe,
but the comparison is a comparison o f two infinities. 37
A moral to be drawn from this is that the importance o f numerical measurements does not re
quire the “absolute” quantities whose existence Tait denies. In T ait’s exam ple, measurements can
be o f interest to a theoretician if they indicate whether an object has a size appropriate to the inves
tigation o f structure o f a certain kind or at a certain level o f com plexity. More generally, just as
practical crafts require measurements o f excess and defect relative to a fixed standard, theoretical
crafts require measurements o f quantity in terms o f units that are appropriate to the task o f the
theoretician.38
I f w e are right about the importance o f comparative and qualified quantities to Plato’s concep
tion o f measure, w e can see not only why he should have been concerned with problems like that o f
the growing boy, but also why he is not interested in a solution to the problem along more modem
lines.

A ristotle’s discussions o f contrariety-in Metaphysics Iota, for exam ple-can be plausibly be
read as a response to Plato’s discussion o f qualified predications. Aristotelian contraries are the
fixed standards needed to ground descriptions and measurements o f features with respect to which
things change. Among these are the standards Plato had said the practical craftsman would need to
measure excesses, deficiencies, and quantities involved in their correction (see the previous sec
tion). But A ristotle’s account o f contrariety also applies to standards that natural philosophers and
36 In light o f Plato’s view s on the centrality o f crafts in human life, an adequate theory o f the crafts
would articulate what is foundational to the proper conduct o f all practical affairs.
37From Tait 1876. The passage is quoted and usefully discussed in Bellone 1980, 40ff.
38 W e believe that a related consideration underlies the cryptic remarks on quantity at Philebus
16d-18d and 22c-25b. Reasons o f space prevent us from pursuing the point here.
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theoreticians need to describe and measure change. W e think A ristotle’s goal w as to develop a
foundational account o f measurement that would apply to theoretical as w ell as practical crafts.
W e have no space in this paper to argue for this story, or to develop any o f its details. But w e w ill
conclude with tw o b rief suggestions about (what we take to be) A ristotle’s response to som e o f the
problems Plato set for him.
XII

First o f all, consider the means at Aristotle’s disposal for dealing with the grow ing boy and
dice puzzles from thë Theaetêtus (sée §viii above). According to Categories 7, 8 a 3 1 ff.,
6.

A feature, F, is a relative (πρός τι) feature if what it is to be F -the being (τό ε ίν α ι) o f
the feature-consists in its being related in some way to a feature, G, whose being con
sists in its being related to F.

For exam ple, what it is to be double depends upon what it is to be half, w hile what it is to b e h a lf
depends upon what it is to be double. Following Porphyry (In Aristotelis categorías, 125.25-29),
w e take the point o f this to be to distinguish the relative features o f a subject from features it pos
sesses ju st in virtue o f what belongs it essentially or accidentally. To illustrate the distinction, re
call Plato’s groups o f dice. One o f them contained 6 dice. This quantity belongs to it non-relatively,
ju st in virtue o f its com position. B y contrast, larger (larger bv half) and sm aller (sm aller by halft
are relative features. By itself, a group o f 6 is neither larger nor sm aller, larger by h a lf nor sm aller
by half. But it is larger by h alf than a group o f 4, and smaller by h alf than a group o f 12. Recall
Plato’s observation that measurements in terms o f relative greatness and sm allness (προς α λ λ η λ α
μ εγέθους κ α ι σμικρότητος κα ι σμικρότητος) are worthless to the practical craftsman because
what makes something greater is just its relation to what is smaller, while what makes something
sm aller is ju st its relation to what is greater (Statesman 283d). So characterized, relative greatness
and sm allness fit (6) above so well that Aristotle’s characterization o f relative features could easily
serve as a generalization o f Plato’s observation.
Since one thing’s possession o f a relative feature (larger or smaller by h a lf in this case) de
pends upon the possession by something else o f a correlative feature (sm aller or larger by half),
what has a relative feature can lose it, and what lacks a relative feature can com e to have it by
virtue o f facts about other things. To bring it about that our group o f dice is no longer larger by
half, w e need only add some dice to the group we were comparing it to, or compare it to another,
larger group. If w e’d like our group to become larger all we have to do is subtract dice from the
group o f 12, or compare it to another, smaller group. Thus, as Poiphyry observed, relative features
“com e into and out o f being without their subjects being affected” (Porphyry, 125.29). This is what
w e take A ristotle to mean when he says there is no change with regard to relatives (Physics V .2,
225M 1).
This suggests a treatment o f the puzzles o f the growing boy and the dice. A ristotle can grant
(3) (above) that for any feature, F, if something lacks F at one tim e and has F at a later tim e, it
m ust have com e to have F. He can also grant (4) that for any incompatible features, F and G, any
thing that has F continuously from one time to the next cannot have or com e to have G during that
span o f tim e. But he can reject (5), according to which a subject that has a feature o f any kind
whatsoever, cannot cease to have that feature unless something is done to it or happens to it. A l
though (5) holds, e.g., for non-relative features, and to relatives possessed only by virtue o f com 
parison to a fixed standards, a subject can lose a feature without undergoing any genuine change as
long as that feature falls under (6) above (Physics V .2, 2 2 5b l 1-13). Therefore, contrary to (5),
nothing needs to be done, and nothing needs to happen to a thing to make it lose or gain a relative
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feature o f this sort. And so it is with the features aquired by the dice and by Socrates in the grow
ing boy exam ple. They are features that fäll within the scope o f (6), not ( 5 ) .39
xiii
Our second and final suggestion has to do with features to which (5) applies. I f all things com e
to be out of, and pass away into, contraries, there must be contraries in all o f the categories with
regard to w hose properties things can change, ignoring substantial change, these categories include
Quantity, Q uality, and Place (e,g„ Physics V .2, 226á24ff. ζαά Metaphysics XIV. 1, 1088a31). The
issues w e are going to consider have to do with changes in quantity. Please note that what we have
to say about them is by no means a complete account o f Aristotle’s treatment o f quantitative con
traries, let alone o f the contraries involved in any o f the other categories with respect to which
things change.
A ristotle’s general strategy for regimenting accounts o f change requires the scientist to identify
contraries he can use to locate the features with respect to which the subject o f his investigation
changes, and to orient his treatment o f the change he investigates. For any given change, Aristotle
supposes there should be a unique pair o f contraries. Its members w ill be mutually exclusive fea
tures such that the change under investigation w ill consist o f (a) the replacement o f one contrary by
the other, or (b) the replacement o f one o f the contraries by an intermediate falling somewhere in
between it and its contrary, or (c) the replacement o f one intermediate by another intermediate or
(d) the replacement o f an intermediate by a contrary. For exam ple, Aristotle thinks dark and light
are the contraries involved in changes o f color; red, blue, and all o f the other colors are intermedi
ates ordered by their relations to them. Accordingly, any color change w ill consist o f (a) a com 
pletely light subject turning com pletely dark (or vice versa), or (b) a com pletely light (or dark)

39 This anticipates points that would become central to early 20th century discussions o f what Peter
G each called ‘Cambridge change’ (Geach 1979, 90-91). In 1903 R ussell (1964, 469) defined
change as
...the difference, in respect o f truth and falsehood, between a proposition con
cerning an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the same entity and
another tim e T , provided that the two propositions differ only in the fact that T
occurs in the one where Τ' occurs in the other.
O f course this definition is inadequate; the change in the truth value o f a proposition like ‘Socrates
is taller than Theaetetus’ requires nothing more than a change in Theaetetus. W e have seen that
A ristotle is w ell aware o f this. And it is remarkable that when one thing loses or gains a relative
feature sim ply because o f facts about what it is compared to, Aristotle says something com es (or
ceases) to be true, instead o f saying that any genuine (non-incidental) change (μεταβολή) has taken
place.
... ένδ έχετα ι γάρ θατέρου μετα βάλλοντος άληθεύεσθαι κα ί μή ά λη θεύεσθα ι
θάτερον μηδέν μ ετα βά λλον, ώστε κατά συμβεβηκος ή κ ίνη σ ις αύτω ν. (Physics
V .2, 2 2 5 Μ 1-13)
In this passage Aristotle uses the notion o f change in truth value by means o f which R ussell tried
and failed to define change as part o f a characterization that distinguishes Cambridge from genuine
changes.
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subject turning one o f the intermediate colors, or (c) the replacement one intermediate color by an
other, or (d) by light or dark.40
This schem e im poses a uniqueness requirement on contraries:
7.

I f a feature has a contrary at all, it has no more than one. ( Metaphysics X .5, 1055b30,
1 0 5 6 a ll, 19-20)

One o f A ristotle’s problems with quantitative change is that things can change with respect to
quantities that don’t seem to satisfy this condition. For exam ple, condition (7) is not satisfied by
such features as being one or more feet long, weighing one or more pounds, etc. ( Categories 6,
5b 1 I ff) . That is because each o f these magnitudes is opposed not to just one, but to an unlimited
number o f different magnitudes, no one o f which has any better qualifications for being called its
contrary than any other. Nevertheless, growing a foot and gaining a pound are certainly changes.
T o accommodate them to his general scheme, Aristotle must find a w ay o f system atically identify
ing such quantities as contraries or intermediates.
A second problem arises in connection with quantities things have by virtue com parison, e.g.,
large relative to a m illet seed or to a mountain (Categories 6, 5 b l7 ). Suppose the sizes o f a par
ticular seed or mountain are fixed. Then things can change with respect to these sizes: if something
is large relative to a mountain at one time and small relative to the same mountain at a later tim e, it
must have undergone a change in the interim. Like contraries, such quantities are mutuàlly exclu
sive. Furthermore, they admit o f intermediates.41 And (as required for all contraries mMetaphysics X .4 and De Interpretatione 7-10) a subject can lack both magnitudes, either because the sub
ject is something like a soul that is incapable o f having any sort o f spatial m agnitude, or because it
has an intermediate, rather than one o f the contrary magnitudes. But com paratives like these are
not definite quantities . Things that are large relative to a m illet seed (avocado seeds, waterm elons,
huts and mountains, for exam ple) come in an enormous42 number o f different sizes. This means
that something whose size changes drastically need not change with respect to such com parative
quantities: a sapling and the mighty oak it grows into are both large in com parative to a m illet seed
and sm all relative to a mountain. The indefiniteness that makes this possible also distinguishes
quantities predicated by comparison to some actual object from the due measures Plato said were
required for the successful pursuit o f the crafts. For example, a nutritionally adequate amount o f
iron, an amount that is either small or large enough to cause blood abnorm alities, and an amount
that m ust be added to or subtracted from the diet to restore health w ill all be sm all relative to som e
objects o f com parison (e.g., the amount o f calcium in an oyster shell) and large relative to others
(e.g., the amount o f titanium contained in a thin slice o f stewed m orel). I f quantitative contraries
are to serve as or provide a basis for the determination o f due measures,and i f the magnitude o f
what.has one o f a pair o f contrary quantities cannot change unless it is replaced by an incom patible
quantity, contraries must satisfy a definiteness requirement:

40 For som e details, see Bogen 1991 and 1992.
41 A t the very least, the size o f a m illet seed or a mountain must fall between the sizes o f things that
are large relative to it and things that are small relative to it. Intermediates are required by Aristotle
to distinguish pairs o f relatives that are contraries (according to Categories 6b 15, som e are and
som e are not) from pairs o f relatives that are not ( Metaphysics X .4, 1057a37 ft).
42 Only A ristotle’s b elief in a finite universe prevents the number from being infinitely large.
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8.

For any pair o f contrary magnitudes, nothing that has either magnitude can be larger
or smaller than anything else With the same magnitude.43

A ristotle’s second problem is to secure definiteness.
A s w e understand it, the leading idea o f Aristotle’s strategy for explaining how quantities can
be opposed in such a w ay as to satisfy both (7) and (8) is that an ideal classification schem e would
sort things into kinds such that-where K is one o f these kinds-as large and as sm all as is possible
for a K (or for a normal, or for a fully developed K, etc.) would be unique, definite magnitudes in
relation to which intermediate sizes could be defined. Aristotle finds he must apply this idea in d if
ferent w ays to different sorts o f quantities for different sorts o f things. But here is one illustration
o f the general strategy.
Increase is a change in quantity that Aristotle characterizes increase as change ‘toward com 
plete magnitude’ (εις τέλειο ν μέγεθος). By contrast, decrease is a change away from this com plete
magnitude (226a23-32). It is not clear just what (if anything) this can mean for all cases. But for
an animal or plant that grows and shrinks (in size, weight, etc.) during the course o f its life, A ris
totle’s talk o f m oving toward and away from complete magnitudes makes perfectly good sense if
there is a definite maximum (or perhaps a unique, developmentally ideal) size that normal, healthy,
mature organism s o f a given kind can attain. These sizes w ill differ from kind to kind; horses can
grow larger than wom bats, and oak trees can grow larger than peonies. The magnitudes o f m axi
mal and minimal sizes are determined, according to Aristotelian biology, by the natural abilities for
nutrition and growth possessed by normal organisms o f various kinds. I f for each kind there is also
minimum size (beyond which no smaller organism o f the kind can survive, or retain its normal
functioning, or something o f the kind), then there w ill be a maximum and a minimum size such that
change in size for an organism w ill be increase toward the former, or decrease toward the latter for
the kind to which the organism belongs.44 W e believe that when Aristotle characterized contrariety
as
9a. extreme or complete difference (μεγίστη διαφορά ai Metaphysics X .4, 1055a4;
διαφορά τέλειος at 1055a 16) between
9b. predicates o f the same genus (1055a26flf.)45
9c. that can belong to the same recipient (δεκτικόν) or matter (ΰ λη ) (1055a29 ff.),46
he w as generalizing from this sort o f account.47 For growth or decrease in the size o f an organism,
the genus (9b) is size, the extremely or com pletely different predicates (9a) falling under the genus

43 A sim ilar condition is required for intermediates, and analogous conditions must be required for
contraries and intermediates in other categories. W e need not, and w ill not try to formulate any
Aristotelian definiteness requirements here. Non-Aristotelian requirements o f definiteness can be
found in E llis 1966, or any other standard treatise on measurement.
44 See Bogen 1992, 17fif.
45 T his is the w ay people define contraries according to Aristotle in Categories 6, 6 a l7 -1 8 . (Cp.
Generation and Corruption 1 .7, 323b 29-324al.)

46 For further discussion see Bogen 1991 and 1992.
47 According to Metaphysics X .4, 1055al0-22, both uniqueness (7) and definiteness (8) can be
secured for any sorts o f contraries for which ‘modes o f com pleteness’ (...το τελείω ς ούτω ς ώς ...)
can be determined. On our reading, for any pair o f contraries (quantitative, qualitative, or spatial)
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o f size are, e.g., m axim ally large (sm all) for a stoat. The recipients (9c) o f which these contraries
are predicated are organisms o f a specified kind. The matters (9c) are their bodies. Change in size
for a stoat is a process by which the animal’s body comes to be closer to one o f the extrem es and
farther from the other than it was at the beginning o f the process. Once the contraries are fixed,
numbers o f convenient units can be assigned to them, and these can be used to characterize inter
m ediates. Suppose that « ounces is the minimum weight for a stoat and that m is the maximum
w eight for tw o numbers, « and m. Neither « nor m has a contrary apart from its being the number
o f a minimum or maximum magnitude for some kind. But « and m are m easures o f contrary sizes.
And for any « '> « and any m'<m, such that m’> n’, what is « 'a t onetim e and m 'at another w ill
have changed in size, increasing toward or decreasing away from the com plete weight for a stoat.
Growing from one o f the « 'to one o f the /«'.w ill be a change because the subject m oves from one
position relative to a com plete magnitude to another-and sim ilarly for shrinking from one o f the m'
to one o f the «'. Growing larger w ill be a change because to grow larger w ill be to grow from one
o f the « ' to one o f the m '.
T o see how this applies to due measures, imagine that you are an ancient Greek physical
trainer who prescribes foods and exercises to maintain the fitness o f a runner. You should know the
m axim al and minimal weights for normal human beings. You should know what intermediate
w eight range is healthy for humans, and appropriate for athletes, like the one you are training. This
knowledge w ill allow you to decide whether she weighs too much or too little. I f you also know
how much pasta is required to maintain weight in the proper range, you w ill be able to find out
whether her diet includes too much or too little, and if necessary, how her pasta intake should be
changed to remedy an excess or defect in weight.
A t Categories 5b24fF, Aristotle observes that what counts as many people in a village would
not qualify as many people in Athens, and that what counts as many people in a house is less than
what counts as many people in a theater. This illustrates an important difference between com 
parative measures o f quantity (like small relative to a mountain) and the specifications o f quantity
by Sortal Comparison that Aristotle uses to explain contrariety and due measure in the exam ples
we have ju st been considering. A group o f people is not many or few relative to the number o f
people who were actually in the house, the theater, the village, or the city at any particular time.
Instead, many and few are understood-depending on what is appropriate for the relevant con textas many for a house (or theater, or village or city to hold the capacities o f the house, etc.) These
magnitudes are determined, not by the populations, but by the capacities o f the relevant places.
A ristotle’s use o f Sortal Comparisons to explain quantitative contraries is analogous to this: magni
tudes are fixed by appeal to the abilities (e.g., for growth) that are characteristic o f kinds o f indi
viduals, rather than the magnitudes that have actually been attained by the members o f the kinds.
The idea that natural kinds are distinguished from one another to an important extent by the
abilities (δ υ νά μ εις) o f their normal members is o f course central to Aristotelian biology. Indeed, if
what w e have been suggesting in this section is correct, an important part o f the work o f an Aristo
telian biologist (who studies natural differences between members o f different kinds o f organism s,
or seeks to develop an adequate taxonomy o f natural kinds) would be relevant to the identification
o f quantitative contraries. W e believe an examination o f A ristotle’s treatments o f other contraries
(e.g., o f contrary colors, tastes, directions and motions in space) would reveal equally strong con<F,G >, w hose members can be possessed by things o f some kind or kinds, K, the ‘mode o f com 
pleteness’ that secures uniqueness and definiteness for the pair is constituted by the abilities o f
normal members o f K to have features o f the genus (e.g., colors, sizes, w eights, etc.) to which F
and G belong. For some discussion o f this, see Bogen 1992.

nections between the identification o f contraries and other departments o f Aristotelian natural sci
ence. It would be nice if someone could find a text in which Aristotle said that his approach to the
natural sciences had been shaped by his approach to the problems o f change, contrariety, and due
measure that Plato left him. It would be nice if someone could find a text in which A ristotle said
that an advantage o f his approach to natural science was the resources it provided for dealing with
these problems. W e don’t suppose there ever were any such texts. But w e dpn’t need them to ap
preciate how important the Platonic problems o f contrariety and change were to A ristotle’s work in
natural science and its philosophy.
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